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THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE, COMPETITION POLICY, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
R. SHYAM KHEMANI AND ANA CARRASCO-MARTIN*
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the role and importance of the investment cli-
mate and especially competition (antitrust) law-policy in fostering sustain-
able, broad-based competitive economic development. While the
discussion is focused primarily on Latin American countries, the arguments
advanced are generally applicable to developing economies in other regions
as well.
The quality of a country's investment climate or business environment
determines the risks and transaction costs of investing in and operating a
business. These risks and costs are, in turn, determined by the legal and
regulatory framework; barriers to entry-exit; and conditions prevailing in
markets for various goods and services, including labor, finance, basic
infrastructure services, and other productive inputs. The quality of the in-
vestment climate essentially determines the mobility and speed with which
resources can be redeployed from lower to higher productive uses. For this
to occur effectively, the nature and degree of competition in markets plays
a pivotal role. There is significant economic evidence suggesting that pri-
vate investment has grown faster in countries with better investment cli-
mates. Also, economies with competitive domestic markets tend to attract
more domestic and foreign direct investment, have higher levels and rates
of growth in per-capita GDP, and have lower rates of poverty. 1
* The authors are, respectively, Advisor, Competition Policy and Consultant in the Foreign
Investment Advisory Services of the World Bank Group; and Financial and Private Sector Development
Vice-President of the World Bank Group, in Washington, D.C. The research assistance and significant
data inputs provided by Ms. Giuliana Cane are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the World Bank Group, its
staff, or its officials.
1. See DEV. PROSPECTS GROUP, WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2003 ch. 3 (2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INGEP2003/Resources/
gep2003complete.pdf; THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVEST-
MENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE, ch. 1 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005]
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete-report.pdf
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Promoting effective competition is often supported on grounds that it
pressures firms to focus on efficiency and improve consumer welfare by
offering greater choice of higher quality products and services at lower
prices. However, it also promotes greater accountability and transparency
in government-business relations and decision-making, and contributes to
reducing opportunities for engaging in corruption, lobbying, and rent-
seeking behavior. Additionally, by lowering barriers to entry it provides
opportunities for broad-based participation in the economy and for sharing
in the benefits of economic growth. Without effective competition, firms
are more likely to possess considerable market power, which enables them
to earn excess profits and wield the political influence to tilt public policy
in their favor. There are also likely to be distorted price and profit signals
and increased risks of misguided investment and output decisions, all of
which can lead to economy-wide repercussions.
The merits and benefits of fostering competitive markets have been
recognized in many countries that have adopted various macro- and micro-
economic reforms. There are presently about 100 countries that have
adopted competition legislation. More than half of these nations have
adopted or strengthened their respective competition policies since the
early 1990s. Relative to other regions, developing countries in Latin Amer-
ica have been at the forefront in embracing pro-competition measures, such
as deregulating industries, liberalizing trade and investment, and enacting
competition (antitrust or antimonopoly) laws. Chile, for example, passed a
specific decree relating to anticompetitive business practices in 1959.
However, effective implementation of competition policy appears to vary
across Latin American (and other) countries, due to such factors as inade-
quate resources, administrative capacity, and political support. 2 Casual
observations indicate that there is a wide variation in the nature and extent
of competition prevailing within and across different Latin American coun-
tries. There also exists wide variation in the economic growth and devel-
opment of different countries in the region. Although the differential
degrees of competition cannot purport to explain wholly the differences in
the economic growth and development of nations, this article argues that it
is one of the most important, if not the, critical factor. While many of these
economies may be encumbered by limitations on human and physical capi-
tal, governance and institutional structures, and other resources, they are
also prevented from achieving their potential by various types of public
policy-based and private sector anticompetitive practices. The primary
message of this article is that developing countries in Latin America (as
2. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 1, at 4-6.
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well as in other regions) need to promote effective competition policy as
part of their overall government economic and regulatory framework.
The term "competition policy" refers to government measures that di-
rectly affect both the extent of rivalry between enterprises and the structure
of industry. Typically, it includes policies that can enhance competition in
local and national markets (such as economic deregulation, liberalized
trade policy, relaxed foreign investment, and ownership requirements), as
well as competition law (also referred to as antitrust or antimonopoly law),
which is designed to prevent anticompetitive business practices by firms
and unnecessary government interventions in the marketplace. 3
While many of the suggested policy measures (such as simplifying
and reducing the costs of regulation, and trade and investment liberaliza-
tion) are pro-competitive, they are insufficient to maintain and encourage
effective competition. Although these measures primarily change the role
of the public sector in the organization and conduct of economic activity-
and appropriately pave the way for an increased and less-encumbered role
of the private sector-they do not address the restrictive business practices
by the private sector; these practices can adversely impact the benefits that
flow from competition, which other regulatory reforms promote.
Some commentators have argued that private sector firms cannot en-
gage in anticompetitive business practices in openly competitive markets
with low barriers to international trade, investment, and entry. Any rents
that incumbent firms may earn will be rapidly eroded by the emergence of
new competitors that are also seeking to earn high profits. There are cross-
section industry studies which indicate that, with tariff reductions and in-
creased import competition, the profit (price-cost) margins of domestic
firms decrease. However, case- and industry-specific studies indicate that
domestic firms and markets can remain insulated from international com-
petitive pressures due to such factors as high transportation costs, nontrad-
able products and services, perishable goods, and business strategies such
as exclusive dealing, foreclosure of important sources of inputs and distri-
bution channels, domestic regulations, and international cartels. In addition,
many developing countries lack an enabling physical and business infra-
structure, adequately developed financial (debt-equity) markets, access to
relevant commercial information, and the like. Moreover, there often exist
a wide range of anticompetitive situations arising from lobbying by large
3. R. Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and Their Rele-
vance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 16 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995).
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incumbent firms that are closely connected to the government and politi-
cians.
In this context, an effective competition law-policy has an important
role to play in protecting and promoting the competitive process. It pro-
vides for a system of checks and balances against restrictive business prac-
tices that may emanate from both private and public sector entities and
allows for pursuit of legitimate commercial interests. The effective applica-
tion of competition law-policy entails not only enforcement and sanctions
against anticompetitive business practices by private sector firms, but also
"competition advocacy," so that government policies and regulations do
not unnecessarily impede the competitive process. It buttresses a healthy
investment climate, thereby contributing to investment, productivity, and
broad-based economic development. To further elaborate on these points,
the ensuing discussion is organized as follows: Part I discusses some as-
pects of the business environment prevailing in several Latin American
countries bearing on business firms' operations and investment decisions.
Part II presents empirical information on the importance of competition and
competition (antitrust) law-policy in reducing market dominance and fos-
tering competition and business competitiveness. Part III provides a brief
overview of the experience and issues confronted in the implementation of
competition law-policy in select Latin American countries.
I. THE PREVAILING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
The degree to which the business environment allows entrepreneurs to
engage in profitable and productive economic activity varies considerably
across countries. A survey conducted by the World Bank indicates that the
principal factors adversely impacting firms conducting business and invest-
ing in Latin America relate to corruption, the judicial system, policy insta-
bility, and anticompetitive policies and practices. 4 On corruption, the "core
survey questionnaire" posed questions such as the extent to which "busi-
nesses have to pay some irregular 'additional payments' to get things done"
to overcome bureaucratic red tape, and whether there is access to superior
officials to "get correct treatment without recourse to unofficial pay-
ments." 5 Questions on the legal system and judiciary relate to resolution of
4. Taxes and regulations were identified as the leading constraint, followed by policy instability.
However, taxes and regulation are generally complained about world-wide, including in industrialized
countries. See GEETA BATRA, DANIEL KAUFMANN & ANDREW H. W. STONE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE
AROUND THE WORLD: VOICES OF THE FIRMS FROM THE WORLD BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY 4,
32 fig.2.6 (2003).
5. Id. at 98-99; see also infra Annex I.
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business disputes in a fair, consistent, affordable, and expeditious manner,
and whether there is reasonable protection of contractual and property
rights. On policy instability, the questions sought responses regarding ad-
vance knowledge and information; consultations; predictability; coherency
and consistency in the application of existing rules, or in the development
of new rules; regulations; and policies by government. Questions on com-
petition focused on the number of competitors (including state-owned en-
terprises), unfair pricing practices by domestic and foreign firms, subsidies,
and favoritism, among other factors.
In Latin America, the percentage of firms identifying corruption are
particularly high (greater than 60%), and include Bolivia, Dominican Re-
public, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela (see
Table 1). A high percentage of firms in some of these countries also identi-
fied other factors that constrained business, such as the quality of the judi-
ciary (Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico) and anticompetitive policies (Mexico,
Peru). It appears that in most countries, policy instability was most fre-
quently mentioned as constraining business (fourteen of twenty countries
surveyed in the region). It should be noted that not all of these countries
have enacted competition law-policies. Specifically, Bolivia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador (at the time of the survey), Guatemala, and
Haiti are among such countries. It seems that the degree of corruption also
appears to be high in these countries-though, of course, having a competi-
tion law-policy does not necessarily mitigate such problems. The case of
Mexico is especially notable, as a high percentage of respondents identified
all four problem areas as affecting their business (see Table 1).
2008]
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TABLE 1: GENERAL CONSTRAINTS TO BUSINESS OPERATION AND
GROWTH6
Argentina 52.0 42.9 73.7 51.6
Belize 30.0 17.0 38.0 32.6
Bolivia 88.7 61.9 73.0 54.7
Brazil 50.0 53.3 90.1 49.7
Chile 24.5 23.5 55.0 23.0
Colombia 59.0 42.0 87.1 38.1
Costa Rica 48.0 30.0 59.0 43.2
Dominican Republic 69.7 49.1 68.5 55.5
Ecuador 87.9 76.5 88.9 51.4
El Salvador 70.3 57.4 71.8 44.9
Guatemala 52.0 46.1 74.3 37.6
Haiti 75.5 44.4 80.0 72.0
Honduras 58.6 37.2 44.4 62.2
Mexico 80.6 66.0 87.0 65.7
Nicaragua 59.6 39.0 65.0 50.5
Panama 64.7 51.6 63.0 52.0
Peru 62.1 47.1 75.5 60.4
Trinidad and Tobago 18.0 11.9 20.8 24.8
Uruguay 29.4 28.6 56.3 22.3
Venezuela 72.9 58.3 94.0 59.8
The World Bank also publishes an annual report on "doing business"
indicators. Included is a composite "Ease of Doing Business Rank" (see
Figure 1). This index is computed by taking into consideration a number of
factors: (1) the time (in days) and number of procedures (including license
requirements) involved in starting a business, (2) problems in obtaining
credit, (3) exporting and importing, (4) closing a business, and (5) difficul-
ties and costs involved in hiring and firing workers. 7 A low ranking on this
index indicates that the regulatory environment makes entry and conduct-
6. See BATRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 1I tbl.A2. 1.
7. E.g., THE WORLD BANK GROUP & THE INT'L FINANCE CORP., DOING BUSINESS IN 2006:
CREATING JOBS 77-93 (2006) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK GROUP, CREATING JOBS],
http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/DoingBusines2006-fullreport.pdf.
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ing business more difficult. 8 The Latin American region ranks third in the
ease of doing business rankings among developing countries. This index
varies significantly in many of the Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries. Chile is the most business-friendly economy in the region and glob-
ally ranks high in the ease of doing business ranking (28), after economies
such as Korea (23) and Germany (21) (see Figure 2).9 However, the good
record of Chile is overshadowed by other countries in the region, such as
Argentina (101), Brazil (121), Suriname (122), Ecuador (123), Bolivia
(131), Haiti (139), and Venezuela (164), all of which are at the bottom of
the scale. ' 0
FIGURE 1: EASE OF DOING BUSINESS AVERAGES ACROSS REGIONS, 200611
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America
MENA
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
It requires 694 days to start a business in Suriname and 8 years to
close a business in Ecuador. 12 In Haiti, it requires 203 days to start a busi-
ness and up to 683 days to register property. The corresponding statistics in
Chile are 27 days and 9 procedures to start a business; however, it requires
171 days for licenses, 5 years to close a business, and 31 days to register a
property. In Costa Rica and Brazil, it requires 77 and 152 days to start a
business and 11 and 17 procedures, respectively. In Colombia, it requires
44 days and 13 procedures to start a business, 150 days for licenses, 3 years
to close a business, and only 23 days to register property. In most jurisdic-
8. Id. at 92.
9. THE WORLD BANK GROUP & THE INT'L FINANCE CORP., DOING BUSINESS IN 2007: HOW TO
REFORM 6 tbl.1.2 (2007) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK GROUP, HOW TO REFORM],
http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/DoingBusiness2007-FullReport.pdf.
10. Id.
11. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, CREATING JOBS, supra note 7, at 1, 110-61.
12. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, HOW TO REFORM, supra note 9, at 95-153.
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tions, unless a business is formally registered, it cannot qualify for com-
mercial loans, obtain tax filing numbers, or apply for various licenses and
permits to start its operations. It is not surprising that many developing
countries, including some in the Latin American and Caribbean region,
have large "informal" economies.
FIGuRE 2: EASE OF DOING BUSINESS GLOBAL RANKINGS FOR LATIN
AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN 13
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Chile 28
Mexico 43
Jamaica 50
Trinidad & Tobago _ _ _ _ 59
Uruguay _ _ _ 64
Peru 65
Mcaragua 167
B Salvador 4 1 71
Colombia -79
Panama 81
Argentina . 101
Costa Rica c 105
Honduras 1 111
Paraguay I 112
Dominican . 117
Guatemala 1 118
Brazil I 121
Suriname 1 122
Ecuador I 123
Bolivia F 131
Venezuela i 164
The "Ease of Doing Business" indicator is limited, as it addresses only
business regulations. Nonetheless, the regulatory burden-especially in
developing countries-does not bode well for fostering new entry, compe-
tition, and re-deployment of resources from lower to higher valued uses.
Barriers to entry and the possibility of an increased supply both play a criti-
cal role in evaluating the potentially substantial lessening of competition,
such as in cases of abuse of dominant market position or in mergers and
acquisitions. Clearly, in these countries and regions, there is considerable
room for expanding competition advocacy. Competition agencies could
promote competition by focusing equally, if not more, on questioning the
underlying economic rationale and time required for many of the regula-
tions pertaining to starting a business and licensing.
13. Id.
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Governments across regions are taking action. At the forefront are the
Eastern European and Central Asian economies, both of which are inspired
by the prospect of joining the enlarged European Union. 14 While Latin
America ranks second in terms of total share of positive reforms (see Fig-
ure 3), overall, the countries lag behind those in other regions.
FIGURE 3: COUNTRIES THAT MADE AT LEAST ONE POSITIVE REFORM IN
2005-2006 (%) (BY REGION) 15
1
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 89
OECD High income 83
Sub-Saharan Africa 67
Middle East & North Afri fr 61
Latin America & Caribbearl 58
East Asia & Pacific 35
South Asia 25
J
FIGURE 4: COUNTRIES THAT MADE AT LEAST ONE POSITIVE REFORM IN
2005-2006 (%) (BY REGION)16
Share of positive reforms
Sub-Saharan
' ouith AiaMI4dle~sst& Nors 1hrtkm0'
OEO Cetra Astihig bwcme
EastAsia
Lattn Amelca
& Caflbbean
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 2 fig.l.2. Figures 3 and 4 are reprinted with the permission of the World Bank from the
Doing Business in 2007 Report. Copies of current and archived Doing Business Reports are available
for purchase at www.worldbank.org/publications.
16. Id. at 30 fig.6.2.
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Within the Latin American region, El Salvador has led in the reform
process for the second consecutive year; it reduced the number of proce-
dures to register a business from twelve to ten, and the time required to
register a business from forty to twenty-six days. 17 Other countries, includ-
ing Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico, have also adopted significant re-
forms for business start-ups. For instance, "Honduras cut 18 days from the
process by delegating company registration to private chambers of com-
merce. Guatemala linked commercial, tax, and social security registration[,
and] Mexico allows entrepreneurs to obtain the tax registration number
through the notary at the time of incorporation-saving 3 weeks." 18 How-
ever, several countries-including Bolivia and Venezuela-have regressed.
Specifically, Venezuela made it more difficult for businesses to get credit,
register property, or trade across borders.' 9
II. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS OF COMPETITION POLICY
The data in Figures 5-8 (see below) provide evidence of the impor-
tance of competition and competition (antitrust) law-policy in fostering
higher incomes, broad-based markets (comprised of less-dominant firms),
and global competitiveness. The data are derived from "perception sur-
veys" of opinions of policymakers, business executives, and various offi-
cials in public and private sector organizations, such as industry and trade
associations, academic research and policy institutions, various nongov-
ernment bodies, and the like. 20 The responses, collated and computed into
various indicators, do not actually measure factors such as volume of trade,
magnitude of intensity of local competition in terms of prices, investment,
turnover of firms, and effectiveness of competition (antitrust) law-policy
implementation (in terms of number of cases investigated and resolved,
fines imposed, etc.). These indicators are useful, however, as they are based
on the views of key and well-informed individuals who are aware of the
array of issues and their impact.
17. Id. at 7 & fig.l.4, 10.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Michael E. Porter, Christian Ketels & Mercedes Delgado, The Microeconomic Foundations of
Prosperity: Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index, in GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
2006-2007, at 58 (Augusto Lopez-Claros ed., 2006).
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FIGURE 5: INTENSITY OF LOCAL MARKETS COMPETITION AND PER CAPITA
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Figure 5 indicates that least-developed countries generally tend to
have low intensity levels of competition in local markets, and also low
levels of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). These countries are
mainly International Development Association (IDA) member countries, 22
and cluster around the horizontal axis, whereas other middle income and
industrialized countries are more widely distributed. Latin American coun-
tries mostly fall into the middle-income category. There is a wide variation
in their per capita GDP and in the intensity of competition in domestic
markets-Argentina has a higher per capita GDP than Chile, but less vig-
21. The data represented in Figures 5-8 were derived in part from information found in the Global
Competitiveness Report for 2006-2007, and from the Porter, Ketels & Delgado article therein. See id. at
60 tbl.1; GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2006-2007, supra note 20, at 123-564. The following
Latin American countries are IDA countries: Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia. No data was available
for Haiti, Dominica, and St. Lucia, also IDA countries. Bolivia, located on the low end of the scale,
does not have a competition law; Honduras and Nicaragua only enacted competition laws recently.
22. The World Bank provides IDA members, which are the poorest developing countries, with
low- or interest-free credits and grants in order to boost their economic growth and living standards. See
The World Bank, Annual Report 2006-Low-Income Countries, http://go.worldbank.org/5GKWZZ
VSGO (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). The list of IDA countries can be obtained by visiting The World
Bank, Annual Report 2006-List of Part I and Part II IDA Member Countries,
http://go.worldbank.org/0KNEYUlJK0 (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
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orous domestic competition. Chile, in fact, has a better record of enforcing
its competition law-policy than other countries in the region.
23
Figure 6 charts the indicators relating to the effectiveness of competi-
tion (antitrust) law and the extent to which domestic markets are dominated
by a few large firms. Many developing countries, including Latin American
countries, tend to have high levels of ownership and product market con-
centration; when coupled with insufficiently-developed financial markets,
related legal-regulatory framework and business infrastructure, and close
government-business relations, this has resulted in a few elite corporate
groups and firms dominating the economy.24 The indicators in Figure 6
suggest that effective competition (antitrust) law-policy can mitigate the
degree of dominance and contribute to less concentrated market structures,
thereby opening up opportunities for broad-based participation in the econ-
omy. Chile has a lower incidence of markets dominated by a few large
firms than Ecuador, Honduras, and other economies that have not yet
adopted and implemented competition law-policy. However, firm domi-
nance can also arise due to the small size of the domestic markets relative
to scale of production, among other factors. Sifting out the different factors
resulting in dominance requires more analysis than is presented here. It is
still noteworthy, however, that the rank correlations between competition
policy and dominance indicators are weaker in cases of least-developed and
Latin American countries than for the more developed or industrialized
countries.
23. See infra Part IlI.
24. See R. Shyam Khemani, Competition Policy and Promotion of Investment, Economic Growth
and Poverty Alleviation in Least Developed Countries 9-10 (Foreign Investment Advisory Services,
Occasional Paper No. 19, 2007), available at http:H!www.ifc.org/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
OccasionalPaper 9_CompetitionPolicy/$FILE/FIAS+Competition+Policy+final.pdf; see also
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Road to Prosperity: Saving Capitalism from Capitalists,
TRANSITION (The World Bank, Washington, D.C.), Jul./Aug./Sept. 2003, at 1-3.
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FIGURE 6: EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION POLICY AND MARKET
DOMINANCE
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Information presented in Figure 7 suggests that effective competition
(antitrust) law-policy is also associated with higher rankings in the business
competitiveness index. Finally, Figure 8 indicates that the effectiveness of
competition (antitrust) law-policy and the intensity of competition prevail-
ing in local markets are positively associated. Again, among the Latin
American economies, Chile ranks high in terms of these indicators,
whereas economies such as Bolivia and Ecuador rank quite low. While
more in-depth research would need to be conducted-taking into account
and controlling for several other factors-these charts nonetheless clearly
suggest the role and importance of competition law in fostering economic
growth, reducing market dominance, and enhancing competitiveness
through the mechanism of increasing intensity of competition.
25. See sources cited supra note 20-21 and accompanying text. For Latin America, n =22 and
rs = -0.55; for other countries, n = 103 and rs = -0.83; for IDA countries, n = 43 and rs = -0.72; for non-
IDA countries, n = 82 and rs = -0.86; and for all countries combined, n = 125 and rs = -0.79.
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FIGURE 7: EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION POLICY AND BUSINESS
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FIGURE 8: EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION POLICY AND INTENSITY OF
LOCAL MARKET COMPETITION 2 7
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26. See sources cited supra note 20-21 and accompanying text. For Latin America, n = 22 and
rs = 0.80; for other countries, n = 97 and rs = 0.85; for IDA countries, n = 39 and rs = 0.61; for non-IDA
countries, n = 80 and rs = 90; and for all countries combined, n = 119 and rs = 0.92.
27. See sources cited supra note 20-21 and accompanying text. For Latin America, n = 22 and
rs = 0.39; for other countries, n = 102 and rs = 0.78; for IDA countries, n = 42 and rs = 0.18; for non-
IDA countries, n = 82 and rs = 0.70; and for all countries combined, n = 124 and rs =0.74.
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It has been noted that
[f]ew roles of government are more important to the upgrading of an
economy than ensuring vigorous domestic rivalry. Rivalry at home is not
only uniquely important to fostering innovation, but benefits the national
industry .... In fact, creating a dominant domestic competitor rarely re-
sults in international competitive advantage. Firms that do not have to
compete at home rarely succeed abroad. Economies of scale are best
gained through selling globally, not through dominating the home mar-
ket.28
The role of government in promoting competitive rivalry has been,
and continues to be, debated among policy makers and advisors, academic
researchers, and others-especially with regard to the degree of protection
and direct support that governments should provide to businesses. A com-
monly cited example is the success of the East Asian "miracle" economies
of Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, where governments provided
"administrative guidance," and departments such as Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) encouraged cartels and mergers
and granted export credits to stimulate productivity and dynamic effi-
ciency. However, even proponents of fostering competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth recognize that maintaining oligopolistic rivalry instead of
concentrating resources and subsidies on a single or few selected "national
champions" was a critical part of the industrialization strategy.29
The "government-led model" has been revisited through an in-depth
examination of a sample of twenty internationally competitive sectors and
seven uncompetitive sectors in terms of the nature, timing, and extent of
government interventions. As it turned out, the government-led model with
major subsidies was almost entirely absent, and there was little evidence of
interventions in competition. 30 Indeed, even casual observations in prod-
ucts such as electronics, automobiles, and consumer durables indicate that
there is vigorous inter-firm rivalry between Korean and Japanese firms in
their respective home markets, as well as abroad. And in recent years, in
both these economies as well as Singapore, vigorous enforcement of com-
petition law-policy has become central to reviving their economies.
Scholars have recently reiterated the importance of inter-firm rivalry
and competition in domestic markets, among other dimensions of the busi-
28. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONs 662 (1990).
29. Alice H. Amsden & Ajit Singh, The Optimal Degree of Competition and Dynamic Efficiency
in Japan and Korea, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 941, 941-50 (1994) (recognizing that, in Japan, MITI fos-
tered oligopolistic rivalry and investment races; while the antimonopoly laws were weak, this govern-
ment stimulated rivalry and increased competition, resulting in decreased industry concentration).
30. MICHAEL E. PORTER, HIROTAKA TAKEUCHI & MARIKO SAKAKIBARA, CAN JAPAN COMPETE?
44-65, tbls.2-2 & 2-4 (2000).
2008]
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
ness environment, such as quality of infrastructure, removal of trade barri-
ers, protection of property rights, and regulatory standards for promoting
competitiveness and economic growth. 31 These and other microeconomic
factors combined are found to account for more than 80% of the variation
in per capita GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis).32 Deconstructing
the Global Competitiveness Index and applying bivariate analysis, re-
searcher Michael E. Porter and others report several interesting results. The
intensity of local competition accounts for about 42% (adjusted R-squared)
of the variation in GDP; effectiveness of competition (antitrust) law-policy
accounts for 65%; presence of demanding regulatory standards accounts for
78%; property rights account for 72%; judicial independence accounts for
59%; and trade accounts for 33%.33 Clearly, while competition and compe-
tition (antitrust) law-policy are important, so are other factors-which,
combined, form the physical and business infrastructure of a modem econ-
omy. And, as one would expect, variation exists across countries, depend-
ing on their income and stage of economic development. Thus, the analysis
of country and economy groups conducted by Porter indicates that factors
such as the intensity of local competition, effectiveness of competition
(antitrust) law-policy, trade, the efficiency of legal framework, and the
presence of demanding regulatory standards are insignificant in low-
income countries, less so in middle-income countries, and have no impact
in high-income countries. These results should not be interpreted as indica-
tive of the unimportance of policies (and institutions) relating to competi-
tion; quite the opposite. As mentioned earlier, inherent ownership,
industrial and financial market concentration, and governance structures in
least-developed countries, coupled with inadequate physical and business
infrastructure, make it difficult to foster competition. Also, the adoption or
existence of effective implementation of competition law-policy in many
developing and Latin American economies is often lacking. The process of
competition is not automatic and takes time to develop, even in more de-
veloped economies; competition is dependent on both business environ-
ments and institutional factors.
Ill. IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW-POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
As previously mentioned, not all countries in the Latin American re-
gion have legislated competition (antitrust) laws. Annex I to this article
31. See Porter, Ketels & Delgado, supra note 20, at 53-58.
32. Id. at 74.
33. Id. at 63 tbl.2.
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provides more information on the countries that do and do not have such
laws. Also, while some countries have yet to adopt competition laws, oth-
ers have amended and strengthened their laws over the years to take into
account changing legal and economic circumstances. However, some coun-
tries have not always consistently or vigorously applied their laws. Compe-
tition law-policy is an evolutionary process, and even in advanced
industrialized countries there appear to be ebbs and flows in its administra-
tion, depending on the government and politics of the day.
A brief overview of the implementation of competition law-policy in-
dicates that, among the Latin American nations, Chile has been a quiet
pioneer over the past thirty years. However, the OECD noted that strong
enforcement action by Chile's competition enforcement authority, the Na-
tional Economic Prosecutor, has not been in the traditional areas of mo-
nopolistic practices and anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions; instead,
enforcement largely pertains to infrastructure services such as telecommu-
nications and electricity. 34 In one such case, the telecom regulator was
prohibited from allocating spectrum to two firms it had chosen, and instead
a competitive auction was ordered. 35 In the electricity and telecom sectors,
the regulator cannot set tariffs unless it has shown that the market is non-
competitive. 36 The competition authority has been very active in competi-
tion advocacy by arguing for adopting pro-market principles in these
sectors. However, the OECD recommends that competition advocacy ac-
tivities need to be broadened to other areas of the economy as well, and that
legal standards and policies should be clarified to guide business. 37 Other
recommendations relate to reconsideration of Chile's approach to merger
control, increased funding for the prosecutor's office, and broadening the
enforcement of the law to cover other types of anticompetitive situations. 38
At the invitation of the government, the OECD has also conducted
"peer reviews" of competition law and policy of other Latin American
countries-notably Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.39 In each case, a num-
34. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] & Inter-American
Development Bank [IDB], Competition Law and Policy in Chile: A Peer Review 68 (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/60/34823239.pdf.
35. Id. at 49.
36. id. at 11-12.
37. Id. at 56-63.
38. Id. at 61-63.
39. OECD & IDB, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America: Peer Reviews of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/15/
37976647.pdf. Peer reviews of other countries can be found at OECD, Competition Law and Policy:
Publications & Documents, http://www.oecd.org (select the "By Department" hyperlink under
"Browse" on the left side of the page; select the "DAF Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs"
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ber of recommendations have been put forward to enhance competition
policy. For example, in Argentina, the OECD singled out areas such as the
budgetary resources of the competition agency, anti-cartel enforcement,
efficiency in conducting investigations and merger review, the role of com-
petition in regulated sectors, the independence and insulation of the agency
from political interference, and the increase in knowledge of judges in
competition analysis as needing more work.40 Similarly, a widely-ranging
set of actions has been recommended for Brazil. The OECD recommends
that Brazil address anticompetitive restraints by state and local govern-
ments; increase competition advocacy with respect to federal legislation
and regulatory programs; consolidate investigative, prosecutorial, and ad-
judicative functions spread across different competition bodies; strengthen
the autonomy of the Commission for the Defense of the Economy
(CADE-the main adjudicative body) by extending the terms of the com-
missioners; step up enforcement actions against cartels; and the like. 41 In
both Argentina and Brazil, the governments have taken steps to amend
their laws or policies to take into account some of the OECD recommenda-
tions.
In addition to such matters, the nature and coverage of competition
laws varies across countries. For example, relative to other Central Ameri-
can countries, Costa Rica has been characterized as the economy with the
most exemptions and exceptions from the application of its competition
law.42 Since its law was passed in 1998, not a single merger and acquisition
transaction has been reviewed and restructured for anticompetitive effects.
Most recently, a cartel case involving real estate commissions was success-
fully investigated and prosecuted, but the total fines imposed amounted to
less than $2,500. In many other countries, the fines for infractions of com-
petition law are so low as to have no deterrent effect. The maximum fine is
$800,000 in El Salvador and $1.5 million in Mexico. The maximum fine is
$10 million or more in several industrial nations.43 In essence, the picture
link, then select "Competition Law and Policy" from the left menu, followed by "Publications &
Documents" on the top menu; choose "Country Surveys/Reviews/Guides") (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
40. OECD & 1DB, supra note 39, at 46-54.
41. Id. at 65-69.
42. See Gloria Rodriguez et al., Libertad Para Competir, ESTRATEGIA Y NEGOCIOS, June 2006, at
150-53.
43. Id. In jurisdictions such as Canada, the European Union and the United States (among others),
the competition (antitrust) laws allow for significant imposition of fines. For example, in the U.S., the
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 was passed by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. This Act increased the maximum corporate fine from $10 million to
$100 million, and the maximum fine for individuals from $350,000 to $1 million. In addition, maxi-
mum prison sentence was increased from three to ten years for criminal antitrust violations such as
price fixing and bid-rigging. In Canada similar offenses carry a fine of $10 million per count and up to
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that emerges is that significant strengthening of competition law-policy is
required in Latin American countries to reap the full benefits that accrue
from promoting effective competition.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding discussion has highlighted the benefits of promoting
competition in domestic markets in Latin American and other developing
economies, and, in particular, the adoption and effective implementation of
competition law-policy. It has been argued that an effective competition
law-policy fosters economic efficiency, increases consumer welfare by
making goods and services more affordable, and enhances business com-
petitiveness. It also reduces market dominance by large incumbent firms,
which is conducive to encouraging broad-based economic growth.
Competition law-policy has a wide interface with various other gov-
ernment economic and regulatory policies that impact prices, output, entry
and exit of firms, trade, and investment. To enhance greater coherency and
consistency in these policies, competition law-policy needs to be integrated
as a central platform. Doing so will improve and buttress the investment
climate prevailing in a country. To attain this requires increased efforts to
promote better understanding of the instruments, requirements, and benefits
of encouraging competition-in government economic policy formulation,
private sector business decisions, and civil society at large.
Although many Latin American and developing economies in other
regions have adopted competition law-policy, effective implementation and
potential beneficial impacts tend to vary significantly. This is undoubtedly
due to a number of factors, such as strongly vested interest groups and
close government-business relations, as well as inadequate resources, tech-
nical skills, supporting institutions, and political will. However, if Latin
American and other developing countries seek to foster sustainable com-
petitive economic growth, increased emphasis on strengthening their do-
mestic competition law-policy is required, and increasing the intensity of
competition in local markets is advisable. In addition to enforcement of
competition law, competition advocacy is advisable for removing unneces-
sary public policy-based impediments to "doing business." The benefits
that accrue from enhanced competition are clear.
five years imprisonment. See BRIAN A. FACEY & DANY H. ASSAF, COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST LAW:
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 471-72 (3d ed. 2006).
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ANNEX I: COMPETITION LAWS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN
REGIONS*
Z0
- Z
W -
Z I-
0 0Z
Protection Against Unfair
Antigua & Competition Bill, 2001Barbuda (regulates competition 2001 CARICOM
policy in Antigua and
Barbuda).
Law No. 22262 of Unfair
Competition, 1980; Law
No. 25156 Defense of
Competition Act, 1999
(as amended by Decree
Argentina 396 of 2001, which 1980 1999, 2001 MERCOSUR
abrogated Law No.
22262). The law estab-
lished the National
Commission on Defense
of Competition (CNDC).
Fair Competition Act No.
Barbados 200219, 2003 (enforced 2003 CARICOMby Fair Trading Commis-
sion).
Belize No Competition Law CARICOM
yet in force
Andean
Bolivia No Competition Law Communityyet in force Treaty,
MERCOSUR
Antitrust Law No.
Brazil 8.884/94 (as amended by 1994 1999,2000 MERCOSURLaw 9781 of 1999 and
Law 10,149 of 2000)
* See International Bar Association, Global Competition Forum, http://www.globalcompetition
forum.org/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2007); SICE Foreign Trade Information System, Trade Agreements in
Force, http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements.e.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2007); World Bank, Competi-
tion Law Database, http://go.worldbank.org/WMPL8EHVE0 (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
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Law for the Defense of
Chile Free Competition 211 of 1959 1973, 2005 EFTA,1973; Decree with Force MERCOSUR
of Law I of 2005.
1992 (compe-
tition princi- Andean
Columbia Law No. 108/05 of 2006. pies are found Community
in the Consti- Treaty,
tution of 1991, CARICOM
Art. 333).
Costa Rica Law No. 7472 of 1994. 1994 DR-CAFTA,CARICOM
Dominica No Competition Law CARICOMyet in force
In the process of adopt-
ing and debating draft
legislation on the issue
Dominican of competition law. ADominic bill on a Market Admini- DR-CAFTA
Republic stration Code is forth-
coming. The provisions
of the Criminal Code are
applied in the courts.
No Competition Law
yet in force. A competi- Andean
Ecuador tion law draft passed a Community
first round of discussion Treaty
in Congress in 2006.
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oZ
El Salvador Decree No. 528 of 2004. 2006 DR-CAFTA
Geaa No Competition Law CARICOM
Grenada yet in force
No Competition Law
Guatemala yet in force (draft in DR-CAFTA
discussion).
Competition and Fair
Trading Act. (The Com-
petition Commission hasGuyana not been established, 2006 CARICOM
thereby limiting the full
effect to the Competition
and Fair Trading Act)
Haiti No Competition Law CARICIOM
yet in force
Enacted
December 16,
Honduras Law No. 357-2005 of 2005; entered DR-CAFTA
2005. into effect
February
2006.
The Fair Competition Act
of 1993, enacted on Fair Competi-
Jamaica March 9, 1993 and 1993 tion Act of CARICOM
entered into effect on 2001.
September 9, 1993.
Amendments
Federal Law of Economic published in the NAFTA, EFTA,Mexico 1993 OfiilGzte MROUCompetition of 1992.ORCO
in June of 2006.
Law No. 601 of 2006.
The law will come into
Naaua force eight months after 2007 DR-CAFTAits publication in La
Gaceta on October 24,
2006.
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F=
Legislative
Decree No. 9 of
Panama Competition Defense 1996 2006 (authority
Law No. 29 of 1996. for protection
and defense of
competition).
No Competition Law MERCOSURParaguay yet in force
Decree No.
25868 and
Legislative Decree No. Decre no
701 of 1991 (ordering 2600e o .
elimination of monopolis- 26004 of 1992, Andean
Peru tic, controlling and 1991 Legislative CommunityDecree No. 788 Treaty,
restrctive practices of 1994, Legis- MERCOSUR
affecting free competi- lative Decree
tion). No. 807 of
1996.
St. Kitts and No Competition Law CARICOM
Nevis yet in force
St. Lucia No Competition Law CARICOMyet in force
St. Vincent No Competition Law CARICOM
& the yti oc AIO
Grenadines yet in force
Suriname No Competition Law CARICOMyet in force
Trinidad & Protection Against Unfair 1996 CARICOM
Tobago Competition Act, 1996
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No Competition Law yet
in force. Ley de Urgencia
No. 17.243 of 2000 (Art.
13, 14 and 15). It is com-
posed of few articles thatUruguay refer to competition protec- 2000 MERCOSUR
tion and avoid anticompeti-
tive behaviors. Mergers
control provisions are not
explicitly included in the
provisions of the Law.
The Government of Vene-
zuela adopted three laws to
promote free market
competition and prevent
unfair trade practices: an
Venezuela Anti-Trust Law (Gazette 1992 MERCOSUR
No. 34,880 of 1992), an
Antidumping Decree
(Gazette No. 4,441 of
1992), and a Consumer
Protection Law (Gazette
No. 4898 of 1995).
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